Georgian Historiography of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (Reading Notes I)

Sergo Gamdlishvili

3 Late autumn 1910, Black Hundred reaction. Three men condemned to death at a field trial: Sergo Giorgis dze Gamdlishvili. Born in a village near Khashuri. His comrades, Tbilisi waterworks worker and turner, Kako Korinteli and Dedrag Zaridze, who was 4 born in a village near Okroqana. Their lives and the end of their struggle are, unfortunately, shrouded in fog. 5 The 1905 Russian revolution and its echoes. First in Iran. Iranian Asiatic despotism. Landlord-pseudo-feudal. 6 The usual Soviet sources on SDs. 7 Industry, lack thereof. The bourgeois-democratic character of the 1905 revolution. Reached its peak in the 1908 fighting in Tabriz after the bombardment of the Majlis. Protected by the legendary Sattar Khan, who stood up for "social justice". Arutyunyan (1956) says: Sattar Khan worked in the Caucasian (oil ?) fields and in rail construction, as a brick factory (kiln?) ostad and in Baku's oil industry and participated in the Caucasian SD movement, Hemmat. Refers to Amirkhizi, who mentions nothing about this, and there is nothing about this in the Georgian press. Refers also to his own monograph on the 1908-09 revolution in Tabriz and the Georgian press. 8 Iran appeals to its class brothers--the SDs in Baku, Tbilisi, Batumi committees replied. Smuggle men and arms to Tabriz. 9 Gives examples of this press (note 11). Also: Bakinski Rabotki, Bakinski Proletari, Sotsial Demokrat, Radochaia Gazeta. Notes Kasravi's important work, which gives high estimation of the Georgian fighters. 10 Quotes pp. 179, 199-200, 251 of the 1939 (?) edition of Kasravi's History. (fn. 17 quotes Fakhra'i, p. 116.) Also Salamollah Javid. Cites Tabriz's Mosavat. 11-12 Also mentions Amirkhizi, Vijuye'i, Safa'i, Taherzade-Behzad, Haravi. (fn. 21 on Karim Keshavarz's high evaluation of the Russian and Caucasian fighters in Gilan.) 13 Only scattered references to native and Caucasian revolutionaries in the march on Tehran from Rasht in the primary and secondary literature. So examined the archives and press from the Tsarist period. But found nothing in the Persian or foreign chronicles. 13 (fn. 23) Fakhra'i's notes that this has not yet been properly studied (p. 8); this is only a general statement. The descriptions are fractured into mostly inessential and tendentious, focusing on material of little importance. (fn. 24) Singles out Kasravi's Eighteen Year History as an example. Fixates on uninteresting details and omits material from a comrade of Yeprim Khan because he doesn't trust him.

14 Who Was the Author?

Akhali Sxvivi, a SD journal, articles from Feb. and March 1910, publishes sparsetis modzraobis istoriidan, pseudonym Gurji Sergo. A large text. Ran for pages in 19 parts. Chronological order. From their arrival from the Caucasus and the long march from Rasht to Tehran. Russian, Georgian, Azerbaijani, Jewish, Armenian, German, and Persian and their brotherly cooperation. 15 Regrets it has not been adequately studied, not just by Soviet Ironists, but by Georgian Ironists. Identify him with (Sergo) Konstantin Orjonikidze. Interesting they don't consider this dubious. In fact, 1) he had spent almost a year in Rasht. 2) His chief activity was as a journalist for the Georgian SD press, a special correspondent. 3) Used Sergo as a party name. But the events didn't take place when Orj. Was in Iran. In my article, 'vin igo gorji sergo?... ['Who was Gorji Sergo?...] (Oct. '69) in drosha, wrote that he came to Iran too late to participate in the events described. Raises this question again. 16 In 1966, A. Kelenjaridze wrote Sergo Orjonikidze--zhurnalisti. Said he published in Lampari and Talghi. Sums up the other valid points covered in the book. Orj. Was in Iran autumn 1909-1910, almost one year. Wrote for Sxiv and Axali Sxiv and Chvens Gazeti and Momaval. 17 Socio-economic-political analysis of Iran. Mostly historical material. Also, his dispatches have no news about the participation of the internationalists (esp. the Georgians) Very little quoted from this material in Kelenjaridze's book. 18 Moreover, as will be said later, Orj. Was not in Iran for much of what was described. Was in Okhrana's prison and then in Baku, etc., then Siberia. He fled from there and went to Baku in August 1909. Got to Iran by autumn. So maybe he got the information second hand? But the editors called the diaries a first-hand account and he presents quotes from the editors to this effect. 19 The Rasht uprising was in February 1909. Gives a vivid depiction of the visit to Sepahdar. 19 These and other examples, later to be cited, show the author had to be someone else. Couldn't have been Orj. Accuses Kelenjaridze of distortion. After the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan, Rasht rose up. Kelenjaridze says that this was led by the Bolshevik group in Gilan and that Orj. played a major role. (fn. 51) Fakhra'i makes the analogous error. (Gives the example.) Tabriz was not occupied in February 1909, the date of the Rasht uprising. 21 Orj. was in Gilan in autumn 1909, did not continue to Tabriz, as Kelenjaridze said, but to Tehran. Cites Kasravi and Gurji Sergo himself. 22 Kelenjaridze says Orj. had much influence on Sattar Khan's movement going to Tehran, this has been spread by certain others who repeated it. The author points out that this is impossible. Besides, Sattar Khan could not have led the revolutionary forces to Tehran; he was in Russian-occupied Tabriz. (fn. 44) Similar errors by S. M. Aliev. This is repeated (?) by V. Kiridov and A. Swerdlov, T. Ibrahimov, G. Arutinian, I. Dubinski-Mukhadze, etc. 23 Needless to say, Sergo Gurgi's writings are very different from Orj.'s themes. No Marxist concepts in Sergo Gurgi. Just lots of details about Bakhtiari cavalry, etc. Decides it was Sergo Giorgi dze Gamdlishvili. He was executed just before the publication of the diary, November 18, 1910, at the age of 28. He entered Rasht with his comrades Nov.1908 to May 1909. 24 Japaridze, the old Bolshevik, entered Iran with Sergo Gurji. Information on him, in addition to Sergo Gurji's diary, comes from S. Aliev's above-mentioned work (p. 206) and S. Javid (p. 83). A short quote from Japaridze's (unpublished?) memoirs. The three went from Tbilisi committee to the Baku committee. Sergo with an Armenian pseudonym and two other Georgians (a villager and a water worker) two days later, went to Lankeran with false documents, claiming to be working for Nobel. Stayed with one Mohammad Baqer. Would work on the bombs. The other two left for organizational work in Baku. Never went to Iran. 1) Aliosha of the Potemkin, a chubby, jolly youth, 2) the German Theodore, an artillerist, tall, 3) 'Diagonali... (Russian), communications, 3) Sergo Gamdlishvili. Also, a Baku student, Pasha Khan, and two Baku Muslims. 25 So from this, we see that Girogi Sergo came in November 1908. He also writes about Sergo's activities later. Japaridze severely wounded in Qazvin May 1909. Stayed in Kharkov. So Sergo was no longer able to see him in Iran. Japaridze returned to Iran in the autumn of 1909. Worked with Orj. in Jan 1910. Lived together in an Armenian's apartment. Again, mentions the two Sergos. One was Sergo Gamdlishvili, an active participant from the end of 1908 to the fall of 1909. The other: distinguished by his political character, was Orj., never mentioned in connection with military participation when Sergo Gurji (?) speaks of his military participation. 26 So 1) It's estimated that Sergo Gambdlishvili entered Iran in November 1908 along with other Caucasians. Also, he participated in the struggles Gurji Sergo wrote about. 2) the pseudonym. His education. This is witnessed by Kalanjeridze. 27 He was a sometime correspondent for Roskoe Slovo. In the diary, there is evidence that its author was working for Roskoe Slovo. His half-brother Yason (Jason) wrote that after he returned from Iran, he lived with some relatives. 28 His half-nephew recalls him writing systematically in his room while hiding. His notebooks went after his death, no recollection where. Mentions an episode in the fighting about building barricades. Gurji Sergo is described as having experience in this during the Russo-Japanese war. Also, Aliosha and an infantryman Petre. We know that Sergo Gamdlishvili was an engineer in the Russo-Japanese war in Manchuria. 29 Again: need to correct the idea that Orj. participated in the constitutionalist fighting. (fn. 59) The author got his information from his brother. Born 1882 in Tbilisi village. Peasants. Giorgi Keykhosros dze Gamdlishvili's family. Out of six kids, only two survived childhood. Studied in Gori. Graduated in 1899. Then to communications technium Graduated there in 1901. 30 Then went to work in the city communications something. Then drafted. In army, came into contact with revolutionaries. Met Suran Spandarian and joined revolutionary movement in Moscow. Participated there in the December 1905 uprising. January 1906 returned to Georgia. After all this, witnessed the peasants' oppression. Fought, but Black Hundreds confronted the red partisans. Goes to Tbilisi. The Black Hundreds tried to keep him from work. But, being a veteran, he was able to get a job in the Baku telecommunications system. Joined an illegal circle in Balakhan-Sabunchi. Arrested in February 1908. Exiled north (Olinotski gub.) but escaped. Returned to Baku. But unable to stay long. The legal SD Akhali Sxvita announced the great need for volunteers in Gilan. Lived secretly in Rasht. 32 With Mo`ez os-Saltane and his brothers. In February 1909, along with some other revolutionaries, attacked the governor's office. Killed the governor and some of his men. This was the signal for an uprising against the Shah. Took the province. Needed to cross a river, hurriedly cobbled together.... His military resourcefulness and professionalism, learned in the Tsar's army. Returned to Baku in 1909 (autumn). Went to Tbilisi and wrote his memoirs. Went to Russia with Kako Korinteli and Sedrag Zaridze, arrested by the Okhrana on the way. Sent to Ekaterinograd. In November 18, 1910. 33 Beginning of Iranian agitation: 1892 tobacco boycott. Russo-Japanese war showed Tsarism's weakness. Then the revolutionary movement against the Tsar Spread of freedom idea with this revolution. Inspired Iranian freedom struggle. The revolutionary masses had some important successes. The coup. 34 The Tabriz uprising. Tabriz as an unconquerable fortress. Quotes Kasravi: If any other city had risen up, the Shah would not have been able to send all his 35 forces against Tabriz. But the author is unable to agree (with Kasravi?) that Mo`ezz, Sepahdar, and Sardar As`ad were.... The three stages of the struggle: 1) The Bakhtiar seizure of Isfahan and the Rasht rising, 2) Gilan and Caucasian seizure of Qazvin, 3) Caucasian and Gilani and Bakhtiari seizure of Tehran. 36 The memoirs deal with the Azerbaijan and Gilan movement. In Azerbaijan, especially Tabriz, there was a relatively conscious and mass character. Sattar Khan, a hero from the masses. Iranian Azerbijan's popular-democratic leadership inspired by the Caucasians. Close communication. The Azerbaijanis, who are neighbors of the Caucasus and are more or less married with it (?) and benefited by bringing what they needed from there. As for Gilan, it is one of Iran's northern provinces, but it does directly neighbor the Caucasus and so has not direct political and economic ties with it. Russian revolution's influence on it was relatively weak. Stagnated politically before the revolution. The broad class of people there did not throw up an indigenous leadership which had learned from its victories, according to Axali Sxivi. This led to the Gilan revolution's character and its outcome. This revolution was prepared and executed by Caucasian and native revolutionaries' initiative. But the benefit went to the anti-Shah khans. 'The more odious the khan the bigger the share. Probably the Persian khans of today are more bloodsuckers than the ones before.... 37 Soviet analysis of khans in Iran. Land concentration and so on. Zell os-Saltane had 2000 villages with up to 1 million inhabitants. In Gilan, Mirza Mohammad `Ali Khan, the biggest landlord in the Caspian area. 38 One of the major causes of the constitutional revolution was feudal oppression. The masses of people were kept in a pitiful state of ignorance. The masses were confused. Could not understand a proper revolutionary movement and its tasks and problems. Although this revolution took on a popular coloration, everywhere it changed into something for the khans and the Qajars. Because of the masses' low consciousness. The revolutionary achievements sometimes came under the control of the khans' representatives. Generally, the Gilanis are very woman-hearted, rascally, two-faced, and cowardly. They are always ready to betray with equanimity everything so that they can gain. When Gilanis need a neighbor, 39 they lick his hands and feet. When he is strengthened, he turns from friend to foe. The author objects to this generalization, says it's referring to the rich khans. He is aware that this might offend the Gilanis. It was about the response of the nobility to the struggle. This evaluation appears from time to time in the memoirs. Voices his disappointment that the rest of Iran didn't rise up like Tabriz and Azerbaijan. 40 It was a bourgeois revolution in its origin and development, although there were changes in the revolutionary-democracy as required. But a politically undeveloped national bourgeoisie. Small and weak proletariat which couldn't form a joint political leadership. Frequently, the provinces were left to themselves. This was bad for the revolutionary process and allowed reaction to take advantage of the revolution. But the influence of the ideas from the Caucasus and the expansion of the revolutionary ideas from among Iranians working in the Caucasus and the SD groups in most of Iran's cities and villages was great enough to compensate for this lack. In the Tabriz struggle, Caucasian humanistic feeling was shown much earlier by the Caucasians than by the Iranians. They first held out a hand to help the struggles and, together with the Azerbaijanis, who were heroes, struggled and suffered much from the Iranian enemy class. The first request for aid was sent to the Caucasians. They asked them to participate. They helped Sattar Khan. Many Caucasians were sent to Tabriz and Rasht and fought heroically. Quotes Kasravi pointing out the extraordinary participation of the Caucasians in Gilan. 41 (p. 8, 18 Year History). Salamollah Javid, too. Sending Mirza Karim Khan to Tbilisi. By now, the Russian liberation movement was no longer in current. Quotes S. Javid, pp. 75-80, on Tabriz. 42 In Rasht, thanks to Caucasian revolutionaries (glosses: SDs), found with difficulty three or four to collaborate with: Sardar Mohiy, Mo`azzam os-Saltane, Karim Khan, Sa`id Hosein Kasma'i, Mirza `Ali Mohammad Khan. Got food, drink, lodging from them. The author then explains how these khans turned from the Shah and backed the constitutionalists. Mo`izz's uncle, Sardar Mansur, had a post in the Shah's government. But for some reason, the Shah thought he was pro-Sattar Khan. Sardar Mansur was forced to take refuge with the British consulate. Amir Bahador Jang extorted him. Then, when he went to the British, he extorted his nephew, Mo`ezz. 43 The latter was highly dependent on the Shah and got insulted and turned from the Shah. He saw it profitable to himself to join Sattar Khan's side. The opposition was delighted. Sa`id `Ali Mohammad was the well-known bourgeois-liberal and Majlis representative Taqizade's brother in law. He had been a Tabriz Anjoman member. Fled to Iran when the Anjoman was attacked by the Shah. Now joined with Mo`ezz. 'This is what the Iranian khans consider revolutionary.... The author adds: They were fellow-travelers who only followed the revolution out of personal interest. With this achieved, they would abandon the struggle.... But the Caucasians, including the Georgians, were sincere friends of their oppressed Iranian brothers and answered their call. But while a few suffering are in Iran, the history of the Iranian revolution will record it for some time. (?) In the course of two months (November-December 1908), 22 Caucasian fighters entered Iran. 44 16 were Georgian, 11 of these were SDs. 5 were nonparty SD sympathizers. 6 were Russians (3 anarchists), 1 Jewish, 1 Tatar SD, and 1 a non-party German. They passed themselves off as Nobel's clerks. They dispersed after December 28 and didn't see each other afterwards. Then came the Dashnaks (described in a fn. as bourgeois-nationalist counter-revolutionaries who were against the workers and peasants movement of the 1890s and demagogically called for freeing the Armenians living under the Sultan and for a Greater Armenia. During the 1905-07 revolution, injected nationalist particularlist passions. This strengthened Tsarism. Much harmed the workers movement, both Armenian and general Caucasian. Played a similar role in Iran, etc.) On December 28, 1908, the Dashnaks held a meeting in the apartment of Khachaturiants. 30 people. 8 were Dashnaks. Considered the current situation. They were informed about the situation in Rasht by the Rasht secret committee. (This is identified as the Sattar Committee, composed, according to Kasravi, of Mo`ezz, Hajj Hosein Aqa Eskandari, Valiko the Georgian, and Yeprim Khan.) The meeting formed a revolutionary organization leadership committee [koligia] or 4 Georgians, 1 Tatar (who translated), and 1 Dashnak. 45 On December 29, 22 Caucasians met in Mo`ezz's palace and incited each other. Intensive preparations for the uprising. The day was spent making bombs and preparing arms. Made all our own chemicals. The lab shook with excitement. Japaridze now writes that suddenly misfortune struck. Karim Khan entered, curious, smoking. The warning didn't reach him in time. All the powder ignited in a wink. People were burned. Powder filled the yard and alley outside. Worried this would reach the governor's palace. The governor, Aqa Bala Khan Sardar Afkham, was totally loyal to the Shah: After the coup, the Gilanis wanted to dethrone Mohammad `Ali Shah and closed the bazaar. 46 They prepared for resistance. Demonstrations appealed to the governor's troops. 3 killed, 12 wounded. Sent the new governor to establish order. Widespread resistance, took bast, but needed armed resistance. Disagrees with Kasravi who claimed (18 Years, p. 8)that the movement had been led by Mo`ezz and his brother. Revolutionary ideas had spread in Iran and were already being put into practice in Tabriz on a wide scale. 47 What the Caucasians brought was not enough. Gathered and sometimes stole money. E.g., Sattar Committee which sent 7000 rubles to Mirza Karim Khan in Baku to buy weapons. But he returned to Rasht empty-handed. Jan 1908, the revolutionaries from the Caucasus took the lead. They waited for the right time. Mo`ezz's preparations in his palace didn't go unnoticed by the governor's palace. But for the time being, nothing. Waited for the right moment. That moment arrived. `Ashura. Tabriz agitators participated. The governor launched a provocation. Bribed someone to kill a Tabrizi feda'i, `Ali Akbar, who was highly regarded by the people. 48 Cossacks had ambushed the Caucasians leaving Mo`ezz's palace. But the Caucasians saw through this. 7000 Tabrizis in Rasht. Mad at the governor for the provocation and demanded that the murderers be turned over to them. The murderers hid in the governor's mansion. The diarist confirms Kasravi (ibid., p. 9). Kasravi restricts, however, to the killing of the Tabrizi revolutionary. The diarist gives more detail. The Tabrizis were not content with scaring the governor (?). He did not send away 300-400 Cossacks (?). 49 Looked with more doubt on the people coming back to Rasht. When Karim Khan returned from Baku, he asked Mo`ezz why he is coming back. The revolutionaries held a hasty meeting. Decided to bring the governor down. Had Mo`ezz tell the governor that Mirza Kharim Khan had gone to Baku to see about his health and that he had no intentions of opposing the governor. The Caucasians (Georgians) were armed and ready. If Mo`ezz was not returned and was arrested, the 'Gurgis... were to attack the palace immediately. After the 'Shi`ite fanatics... go to `Ashura, they were to see the governor and pray there. The governor was worried. Worried they would not excuse the shedding of the sayyed's blood (that of Mirza `Ali Akbar). So he had the contingents stations around his palace. But the governor had erred. The Georgians advised the crowd (!) to disperse calmly. The governor was afraid of the crowd, but had bigger worries in 4-5 foreigners; 50 they used the occasion to scope out the gates of the governor's palace and to put their plans into operation. No one paid attention to these foreign guests examining the guns and cannon, what type they were. The governor figured after `Ashura, when nothing happened, that he was safe. Reduced the guard to 100 and some patrols into the city, carousing, etc. Meanwhile, the military staff continued. 7 Tabrizis feda'is joined in with the Caucasians. A few guns found. Starting January 12, the circle met every day. The most important meeting was on January 25. Met in Mo`ezz's palace. Among them, Dashnaks, including Yeprim Khan, according to Sepahdar's memoirs. Yeprim Dadidiants. The Dashnaks only joined the Iranian revolution after the autumn of 1908 when Tabriz drove out the Shah's governor and the reactionary bands. Up to that point, they had their participation in the revolution in fear of the Shah's troops destroying the Armenian population. Yeprim himself was a capable man. Owned a brick factory in Rasht. When the revolution was being prepared in Rasht, the Dahnaks brought Yeprim towards the leadership of the revolution so the, if it should win, they could take advantage of it. In their opinion, if 63 of the best men are not prepared, it is pointless to even consider a struggle. Among them, 17 had to be cannoneers. The Caucasian Dashnaks were intriguing. The point was that the Caucasians, i.e. the 51 Georgians, could not muster 60 people. They then declared that they would not recognize any staff which did not include local people. They demanded the abolition of the current staff and the election of a new one of 9 men. There should be 4 Iranians and 5 Dashnaks. They said that the Georgian group had to be subordinate to this staff and that the staff had to be apprised of everything. In the event of resistance, they threatened to pull out of the uprising and threatened to betray the uprising's plans. The diarist: They wait until the last minute and then spring this on us! The true revolutionaries saw this as a blow to the revolutionary cause and exposed the Dashnaks' conduct. The impact on (?) the local Gilanis. When the answer was read, it was applauded to the cries of 'Long live the Georgians!... (in Turkish). Yeprim forced to leave. In Japaridze's memoirs, 52 he calls this counter-revolutionary. Although sometimes diverges from the diarist, his writing is about ten years later, but he gives much detail about the preparations. Especially about the 60. But he says that there was an actual scuffle and that Yeprim and Nerses were forced to flee, leaving their hats on the table. Also discusses relations between the revolutionary and reactionary forces before the rising. The governor had 300 armed men. They had fewer forces, but had bombs they had made. Slightly different analysis from the diarist. Otherwise, satisfyingly similar. Also: Japaridze says that they got instructions from Baku on relations with the Dashnaks: Must have relations with them. Yeprim and Nerses have well-armed fighters. In fact, Karim Khan and Mohammad Baqer put the Dashnaks in contact with Mo`azzam os-Soltan. At home, he coordinated their leaderships. 53 The similarities confirm they're written by the same person. (?) We have little information on the historical events of January 25 and 26. Both the diarist and Japaridze say the revolutionaries had no sleep, all night preparations. Some clean weapons, some prepare bullets, etc. On January 26, 8 a.m., the weapons were ready, only 29 fighters gathered. 120 Mauser bullets, 80-90 rifle bullets, 43 hand grenades. I.e., these . Mirza Mohammad Khan came and announced that the governor had gone to his pleasure garden, Bagh-e Modir, only 4 or 5 sentries remain. It is time. All realized what this meant. Drew lots, chose 7 to attack the governor. One Russian (Aliosha), the rest, Georgians. 54 The attack. 1:30 a.m. (?) attack by the seven. The rest concentrate on the yard with cannon. Within ten minutes, the firing began. The gate crashed and the castle was charged. The foe fled. Kasrm'i fired a gun. The seven approached the garden where the governor was. The governor ran into the palace. Hit his forehead and fell on Mo`azzam. The fighter shot him ten times. Two other agents killed. Then another bomb shook the palace and echoed. 55 (Calls the Dashnaks droshakel.) 4 or 5 Dashnaks, including Yeprim, went into battle. Shelva Doidze wounded in the knee. Died when a bomb went off in his hand. They occupied the `Ali Qapu, breaking the locked gates and killing the soldiers inside. More shooting from the Cossacks on the third floor of something. A bomb quieted them. The revolutionaries entered the andarun. Cossacks killed one of the best fighters, Petersburg student Pasha Khan. This infuriated the fighters, who massacred them. The soldiers in the second palace fought and blocked them. A few revolutionaries arrived and they fought their way in. They asked the soldiers to surrender in vain. 'We burned the palace and killed... It would be a shame to fall into his (?) hands alive. So they burned the ceiling with a lit torch. Suddenly, the building caved in, bringing 20-25 soldiers to the ground. Four-hour battle. The revolutionaries gained 600 various guns, 4 cannons, 500 grenades, some horses, etc. 56 All clear whistle given, sign to rally. The people cried out zende bad Gorji. The people ran up to embrace them. Great and small, men and women, called out yashasin Gorji, kissed their hands and feet (explains: a Persian gesture). After 12 o'clock, went and rested. The dead comrades and soldiers were buried. The Tabrizis buried the sentries. Two revolutionaries were killed and 8 wounded. 56 Cossacks were killed, up to 100 soldiers wounded. 150 surrendered alive. Governor and 2 other agents killed. The rest of the reactionaries took refuge in the Russian consulate. No other history has such detail. Kasravi describes the last moments of the rebellion (p. 9 of 18 Years). 57 Compares Kasravi's version. The soldiers were leaderless and fled. 58 Also: Amirkhizi, who says the defenders (Cossacks) in the Bagh-e Modir were killed. Mo`ezz went to kill Mofkham, but got `Aziz ol-Mamalek instead (pp. 276-78). Kasravi has the local leadership of these events in the hands of the khans. But the diarist has them only as guides. They avoided personal involvement with the fighting. Then the author gives Japaridze's version: Late in the a.m. (of February 8, 1909), it became known from the governor . 59 5-6 men led by Valiko of Batumi. One of them was Mo`azzam, who knew the area well. We were armed with three-shooters and there was a Muslim comrade. Our first bomb, they fled. The governor ran for cover. Mo`azzam found the governor, but Valiko shot him. Also killed were some of his guards. They soldiers fled. We seized the cannons. Just then came Yeprim and Nerses. We put a torch on a bookcase. The palace ignited. When it ignited, a cheer went up in Russian, Georgian, and Armenian. Then we heard our comrades were in the fire (?). Soldiers surrendered. By nightfall, the city was in our hands. 2 dead: the student Pasha Khan and the Georgian shoemaker Sasha Avlabreli: a bomb went off in his hand. I was wounded in the foot. Messages were exchanged between Sablin and Shtriter (the Russian consul in Rasht). 30 and 100 soldiers took refuge in the consulate. 60 In the Shah's winter quarters, incomprehensible optimism that order would be reestablished in Rasht. Amir Nezam will take care of it with his 400 cavalry. But all confirm that 1) the Caucasians including the Georgians, played a major role, 61 2) the Dashnaks were erroneous, two-faced, and cowardly and only joined when the balance was clearly on the revolutionaries' side, when the resistance had surrendered, 3) the revolutionaries' resourcefulness, 4) the governor was killed by Gorgi Valiko. Kasravi: telegram says 36 enemy dead; diarist: 56. The author takes an agnostic view. The local people were physically involved in the first revolutionary measures to strengthen the city's revolutionary liberation and weaken the city's reactionary restoration. The Georgian forces exercised great tact, caution, and foresight. Careful about the fact that they were foreigners. 62 A meeting was held on the front yard of the governor's palace in which the aims of the constitutional movement were clearly laid out to the people. Cancelled because Kasma'i was ill. Later, a meeting was held on the occasion of Sepahdar's arrival. Description of Sepahdar. Landlord, etc. As early as January-February 1907, during the governmental crisis, approached the Shah pretending to be championing the people's interests. To improve his reputation. When the Majlis was opened, his son, Amir As`ad, went as a liberal. Shah sent him to Tabriz after the coup. Went in August 1908. but was dismayed at taking position between Sattar Khan's liberals and the cruel reactionaries. Saw that Tabriz's defeat would not be so easy. 63 The Kasravi story (History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, p. 268). The Ivanov story: Shah replaced him with Arshad od-Dawle. When the Shah wanted to bloodily destroy the liberals, he went into action against the Shah and returned to Tonakaban and joined the feudal opposition to the Shah. The Amirkhizi story (pp. 1810182). His ideological evolution. Clash between the mild Sepahdar and the zealous `Ain od-Dawle led him to contact the Sattar Committee. Returned to Gilan and bade his time. Invited to Rasht on the second day of the 64 revolution there. As Japaridze wrote, the revolution lacked a local, experienced, and authoritative leadership. But also the most militarily experienced local. The Georgians lacked knowledge about the local military customs. Aside from him, only the two khans and their friends. So they were forced to agree to the Rasht Anjoman and the Sattar Committee to have Sepahdar in the leadership. The simple people who know Sepahdar began to look with distrust, according to the diarist, on the leadership. The Georgians describe a speech on this by Kasma'i: 'If he is being let in, it is because we and all Iran need him. If the neighbor comes to us, is it not we who are honored? If anyone acts against the people, it will be the Georgians who will pay him back. Let Mr. Sepahdar pass, who all the Georgians and we greet.... In his answer, Sepahdar's representative hypocritically said, 'Our great lord Sepahdar is a great khan and is himself the people's friend and the people's gift.... The 10,000 gathered outside greeted this with applause. 65 From this, it is obvious how the Georgians distrusted him. (?) Quotes Ivanov (p. 354), who claims the Georgian mojaheds had an important role in Rasht and Tabriz, it undercut Sepahdar's authority. The military committee, e.g., didn't give up its guns and arsenal. It remained only in decree that they should. The Feda'is were fully armed with what they had picked up after the coup. Sepahdar gave up control to this committee. Cite Kasravi (18 Years, p. 14). Churchill in Iran, British translator, sent from Tehran to Gilan. 66 Estimate 50 Caucasians. Now up to 350 fighters. Most of them are foreigners (?). And the three brothers, Mo`ezz, Hamid os-Saltane, Karim Khan. The bazaars reopened. Red flag flies from the palace roof. Sepahdar wants Gilan left alone. (So Sepahdar was only for defensive tactics from the start.) Burial of Pasha Khan, January 28. On the next day, buried Shalva Dolidze. The Iranians were very interested that the man who died was a Georgian. 2-3 versts they lined up. Including Armenian churchmen. 67 'This man who died for Iranian freedom we little knew and had been so short a time here. We had considered the Georgians our enemy. But we now see that the lifeless body before us is that of the Georgian Shalva, son of Georgia. Although this many times been an enemy of our homeland, it has found enough friendship. Here is our Iran's friendly people, the Georgians. From now on, let nothing separate us and friendship with the Georgians. A free Iran salutes Georgia's Shalva. After that, the European women started weeping. The Iranian women followed and prayed for the dead. Speeches at the grave in Russian and Persian. Fire salutes into the air. Dirges played. Cossacks come from the Russian consulate, amused by the funeral. In the current situation, the Shah was vulnerable to an advance by 200-300 men. 68 Cites Kasravi (18 Years, p. 11) Sends 400 cavalry from Tehran. Low morale of Shah's army (Ivanov) Marauds on the way. Sattar Committee=Military Committee. Its members: Gilan--Mo`ezz; Tabriz--Aqa Sayyed `Ali Mortazavi; Yeprim; Veliko Gurji (Batumeli); Caucasian Muslims--Ahmad Sadeqov. Their job is to supply provisions and arms. Also to keep order is the local anjoman, which had been set up after the revolution. The leadership of the Caucasian fighters (of which there were now up to 200 men, among them 40 Georgians) proposed Valiko to be the chief. But he refused: didn't know the local language. So Yeprim got it. 69 Japaridze recalled that Yeprim snobbed and gave himself the rank of khan. Mo`ezz led the Muslim fighters. The Bulgarian Panov came with some Baku toughs (qoch). Everyone had misgivings about him from the start. 'More of an unterofficer than a revolutionary,... according to the diarist (?). Meanwhile, the so-called leadership, or the 'revolutionary... khans, 'changed fronts... and started to plunder in the name of the anjoman and the revolutionaries. They had no interest in future struggles and dangers by what means they filled their pockets. The goal of the Majlis had united all at the beginning of the revolution, from the clergy to liberal feudal aristocrats, etc. Each saw their interests init. Then class cleavage opened by 1907. The same with Rasht after the revolutionary there: The anjoman and the khans became opponents, each claiming the title of liberal. But the revolution followed its course. 70 Due to the weakness of capitalism, there was no firm anti-reactionary force. The Military Committee did nothing to stop it (it did not considerate had the capacity to stop it.) Weakened the movement and the people's will and the hope in the revolution and the revolutionaries. Shah tries to get the Shahsevan to act. 71 The governors say they lack money and bullets, and bow out of helping the Shah. The revolutionaries set off on January 30, 1909. They sent 24 (=11 Georgians, 8 Armenians, 5 Iranians) on the Qazvin road to Tehran with adequate arms, on horseback. Barricaded the road from Qazvin so they could not reach Rasht. The diarist says they crowd called out, 'Long live the Georgians, long live the Armenians, long live the constitution.... 72 Fired into the air, changed their horses. Sounds of jubilation filled the streets. The revolutionary fighters passed the Russian consulate and sang the Marseilles. The consul employees joined in from the parapet. They continued occupying road stations. On January 31, reached Rostamabad. Up to 500 villagers. Brought them red flags and cried out, 'Long live the constitution.... 'Long live the Georgians.... Before this was a khan who called himself constitutionalist. The revolutionaries spent the night in the village. 73 Next morning, prepared for having been overtaken by the reactionaries. Barricaded and prepared an ambuscade. Three were detailed to get the locals to prepare this. Four from the revolutionaries reached Rudbar. 82 versts from Rasht. The kadkhoda and the peasants gave them a warmhearted welcome. Details provided about Rudbar in the diary. Important location militarily. Kurdish villagers. More details. Sepid Rud. The Caucasian fighters cleverly fortified positions. Took station in the caravanserai. Studied their environs and, on the second day (February 2), further barricades. Included the author, who had experience in this during the Russo-Japanese war. Aliosha (how did he get there?) and Tropim Andiras dze Gonharovi. The reactionaries killed him in Rasht in June 1910. This greatly angered the people. Enjoyed great prestige among the Russian and Armenian fighters in Iran. 74 came to Iran with Sergo Gamdlishvili in November 1908. In 2 days, 9 ambuscades. A Russian report summarizing this is quoted from Ivanov. The Caucasian revolutionaries are plagued with hunger and thirst. They had to advance on Qazvin and destroy the enemy, but the so-called Military committee didn't have the will to advance. On February 6, the revolutionaries finished their job, when 60 peasants were sent from Rasht. They were armed with guns. 12 Caucasians came with them. A cannon, too. On February 10 cam Mo`ezz with 4 Georgian fighters. So the revolutionary forces were gradually advancing. February 15, first news of the enemy's appearance. In a half hour, the revolutionaries were ready for combat. Sent out recons. Then, some Gilani khans betrayed. When danger approached, they abandoned the field. But the Caucasian revolutionaries were vigilant and were able to get them to return to the village and participate in the fight with the enemy. The ambuscades. 75 As a result, there were a few fighters short. The Dashnak representative sent 25 Iranians. Ten of the best fighters. (?) The enemy didn't appear. But the maneuver confirmed the revolutionaries' discipline, organizational preparedness, high consciousness, etc. Just then, the Feodor Panov affair began. 'The famous adventurist.... Arrived only after the Rasht revolution succeeded. January 28. Was well-versed in Iranian affairs. Was accepted into the Military Committee but soon controlled its leadership. Made baseless and senseless allegations about the Rasht revolutionaries who'd gone to Rudbar, which stirred up anger. Soviet scholarship's negative view of Panov. Confirmed by the diarist. Before coming to Russia and Iran, a Macedonian chetnik. Betrayed his chetnik comrades and passed to the 76 Austrian and Prussian powers and passed their plans and documents to them. (Cites J. Hone, Persia in Revolution) Then went to Russia. The gazettes sent him to Iran as a correspondent. In Tehran, gained Hartwig's trust. But after the June 1908 coup, he was exiled from Tehran. Falsified news dispatches. Returned to Iran 1909, first to Rasht. Split the Military Committee, but then participated in the constitutionalist fighting forces staff in the seizure of Astarabad, where he went up. Ivanov calls him an unprincipled adventurer. Kasravi and Javid called him a courageous and experienced SD. Disputes this. Quotes Kasravi on Panov (18 Years, p. 12): 77 Panov send message to the RSDWP complaining Mohammad Amin Rasulzade came from Baku to investigate. Was forced to leave Rasht (?). The anjoman gave him 500 tumans, along with Sadeqov, Mirza Mohammad Hoseinzade, and four others, and for going from Anzali and Astarabad. Javid says that Panov was knowledgeable and familiar with party-building. The Sheikh `Abd `Ali Mo`ayyed affair. Goes to Petersburg. Introduced him as a Najaf cleric. In Gilan, he offended and opposed Sepahdar and so there was a disagreement between him and the Sattar Committee. The SD Committee was compelled to investigate the issue and sent representatives. So Rasulzade came along with someone else. Panov went to Astarabad with 50 others, including Ahmad Sadeqov, 78 Qazanchai, Hoseinzade, `Abdollah Yekdast, Ahzade (?) Khalkahli, , Charles Farangi, and three others. Entered Mashhad etc. with red flags yelling, 'Long live freedom.... The author objects that Iranian authors rely on imprecise information, they write things about him he doesn't deserve. But neither Iranian nor foreign scholars are clear on the source of the controversies with Panov. In Ivanov's opinion, 'They split over something.... Kasravi is also not specific. Only Salamollah Javid offers an explanation, but still not specific on how he offended Sepahsalar. Only the diarist.... First, he asks who Panov is. Panov fought in the Russo-Japanese war as an officer in Manchuria. Powerful explosives man. 79 The Iranians said this intellectual-adventurer is a liberator and, thanks to the qoch in Baku, he got into the leading staff. The more experienced Georgian and Armenian watched him with concern from afar. As soon as Panov got on the Committee, he began to act for himself. Neither recognized the Rasht anjoman nor the rest of the Revolutionary Committee, nor any other revolutionary formation. He saw the 20,000 tumans, paid by Talish's reactionary governor, the weapons and what had been acquired, as his property. Had a bodyguard of Baku qoch. With stolen money, began buying up idle Baku kids who called themselves revolutionaries. After Rasht was taken, they came in armed to the teeth, passing their time in boasting. He used on the Central committee members who . When he had picked a satisfactory force, Panov openly promised all the honorable people to form an army: Sepahdar, Mortise os-Soltan, the Anjoman, and the Georgians. Panov yelled, 'Those who are Georgian .... The rest of the qoch mocked the Georgians. But the staff's Georgian leadership knew well what was going on and denounced Panov's provocation and took measures to clip his wings and, with strong help from the locals, the Iranians, he was exiled not only from Rasht, but from Iran. In spite of this, the Georgians retreated and the Armenians never participated in future battles (?!) This threat caused them to think and make the anjoman question their trust in the Georgians. 80 Then, according to the diary, on February 20, two representatives of the Rudbar fighters returned to Rasht. On that day, the Georgian, Armenian, and other Caucasian fighters were invited. The Baku qoch were not invited. Were they to expel the qoches from Rasht as well as Panov? Threatened a split which would weaken the revolutionaries. So they decided that his being exiled was a good idea. On February 22, the Georgians called for a meeting. An expanded meeting was held. Present were the Gilanis, the Tabrizis, the Armenians, and some of Panov's Baku qoches. Only some of the latter. 'The meeting has to try Panov; if guilty, he must be exiled from Iran.... Panov refused to attend the meeting himself and no one could convince him to come. The chair elected was the Azerbaijani chauvinist Mirza `Abdollah. Long discussion. His supporters came in. said how useful he was and that he must be left in Rasht. Many described him as he really was not. Called him Iran's saviour and him. On the other hand was the Georgian leader of the Military Committee, Veliko of Batum. Appeals for attention. The Iranians don't trust Panov and united to demand his expulsion from Iran. The meeting called for his exile from Rasht and cheered, 'Long live the constitution.... But Panov didn't recognize this decision. Appealed for the Rasht Anjoman's support. 81 The Baku qoches intimidated the Anjoman to its will. It gradually fell on the Georgians to take a firm position on Panov's presence. They decided they'd better do it themselves No other choice. Just then, over the border comes an emissary from the Baku SD Committee, Rahimzade, 'who obviously didn't know the facts of the case,... according to the author. Panov had lied about himself in an article in Novoe Slovo that the Russian consul had thrown him out of Tehran for calling Mohammad `Ali Shah a vigilant enemy . Used Ruskoe Slovo to promote lies about himself. His being expelled from Tehran, was it a result of his politics? 82 (n. 190) Ivanov confirms that Panov it was who sent Browne the article criticizing Liakhov which Browne printed in his book. Portrays it as it if were revolutionary (?) and used it to strengthen his authority. An expanded committee decided that Panov's exile was unrealizable. (February 22). He took it as a joke and had no intention of going. Might cause a split among the revolutionaries. So that Panov could have enough force to answer his rival, he was to be armed as much as the Georgians and have half the weapons, e.g., bomb-making material (explosives which, as said above, had been brought in from abroad.) (The explosives had been made by the Georgians in Rasht.) Otherwise, he would take them by force and boldly prove how with a few qoches, he could the city. He tried to make a coup against the Georgians and yelled about how they were trying to kill him. The Georgians were on alert this whole time to retaliate against Panov. Panov mocked the Georgian accent. The Baku Committee sent Rahimzade and Rasulzade; these took Panov's side, against 83 his being exiled. Humiliated the Georgians' role in the fighting. 'I know more about Panov,... he declared. 'His machine is more important than bombs.... Comments that no one had yet seen his 'machine... inaction. The diarist records the following reply, given in revolutionary pathos: 'We did not come to Iran as Georgians, but as internationalists and revolutionaries. But you, Panov, who have seen us and know us well and hold us in high esteem (?), we no longer need you. And so we wish you, Saviour Panov, farewell.... Valiko contacted his comrades by phone and prepared to go home. Just then, the troops in Patina on the road to Tehran met reactionaries and arrested them. Among them were the late governor's son and a provincial governor. Also a Russian gendarme officer who said that Kurds resisting the revolutionaries. On March 25,theGeorgians who had returned from Rasht met and decided to return to Rasht. Contacted the Rasht Anjoman early March 26 and informed them of their decision. The anjoman and the military committee asked if they were sure. 84 take seriously the issue of Panov's presence in Rasht. Lies about himself in the Russian pres: Panov takes a city, Panov inspects a bridge. Articles in Ruskoe Slovo and Rech. Cheap sensationalism. He had not been wounded in Astarabad and this was not why he left Iran. Indeed, Panov had been wounded, but when? Panov had robbed some wealthy Muslims, 1500 rubles. Was arrested and put in the Russian consul. Was hit by a Browning and slightly wounded. The qoches left Panov behind and was hidden for three months by (at?) Podolski. The reason for his being wounded was told according to his story (?) I was wounded in Astara with (next to) Charles, who told me that Panov is in the Ottoman empire, this happened May 21, 1909, and when I was told of Panov's address, I was amazed and asked how he (?) knows Panov's address. This was Sergeant Charles, who was close to Panov and whose heroism he wrote about in Ruskoe Slovoe. He was actually a Tatar from Anzali and worked in the Russian consulate. Called Charles because he knew French well, the knowledge of which is not surprising in Iran. Now 85 Chirkashvili: Panov's wounding was mentioned in other sources, but never the circumstances. His comrades broadcast the idea that he'd taken refuge in the Ottoman Empire. His going to Astara was led by Yomud Turkman tribes, pro-Shah, marauders. In Astarabad, they burned the city's suburbs to ashes and burned down neighboring villages. The villages population fled to Astarabad and the Russian consul. Caused a panic that Panov would burn down the city. The revolutionaries were furious, gave up their arms and surrendered to the Consul, according to Dogopolov. They said we will not stay in Iran, but will go to Russia. So concluded Panov's last adventure in Iran, which left so many innocent people in such misfortune. The internationalists waged a struggle against Panov and the native compromisers and successfully investigated (?) the road from Rudbar to Manjil. 86 Thence to Qazvin. Rid the neighboring points of reactionaries. On February 29, barricaded Rudbar. From Manjil, had to Qazvin. Danger in pushing forward: The Russians had been pressuring the Shah to tke energetic measures against the revolutionaries. Make a stand at the bridge at Manjil. But the Shah's forces could no longer stop the revolutionaries. Rasht versus Sho`a` os-Saltane. Quotes Nazem ol-Eslam and Kasravi. 87 Including attempt on his life by SDs from Baku. Notes that these people accepted individual terror as a tactic, incompatible with RSDWP program. The revolutionaries, according to the diarist, seized four new guns for the latest kind. The anjoman got 500 tumans of Tatar money and allowed him to go to Tehran. He was escorted by Georgians in Rasht to the front and 88 transferred, accompanied by Ottoman consulate officials. They then turned to the Ottoman representatives with an honor guard. On Sho`a`'s return, official Russian documents show it was not coincidental. He was to be Sepahdar's replacement. But the revolutionaries blocked him February 5. The anjoman made him pay 100 tumans. Quotes Kasravi. Sepahdar is insulted. Russian sources: 50 C0ssacks sent as pickets 89 Kurdish troops stationed along the Qazvin highway. March 18, under the governor's son, Naser Khan. Gathered Kurdish clans and armed them. Met with the Georgian representatives and boasted and threatened, 'I won't give way to the atheist Georgians.... Whoever sets foot on this bridge will see....... He hoped the local Kurds would support him, but the didn't. A battle. The revolutionaries were newly-arrived Georgians and Armenians. A night battle. March 18. Took an evasive route. Pitch-black night. The scouts got detached from the main body. The fighters lost their way in the dark and scattered. The leader's gun unexpectedly discharged. The fighters who were scattered immediately rallied and advanced. Contacted the scouts and found the enemy position. They were two groups: the Georgian-Russian in the 'Georgian... group and the Tatar-Iranian-Armenian with Yeprim. They quickly found the caravanserai 90 in which Naser Khan was and seized him. Fighting broke out on both sides and bullets hummed around. They fled to the Gilan mountains. Were cut off. Both generals, Naser Khan and Ebrahim Khan, were in the caravanserai and were prepared to defend themselves. Suddenly encountered a Georgian group led by Vaso the Avar. Shot Naser Khan in the hand, but took him alive. The revolutionaries decided to shoot him. Took 8 horses, gun, bullets,etc. The revolutionaries told the peasants about their lord's execution and they tearfully gave them gifts not to let either of their lords out alive. The diary conveys the enormous hatred the peasants had for their landlords. 'We will no longer call you our Sun. Fought in your wars. 91 You were always quick to deliver us to all forms of torment. Now we will execute one of you. The revolutionaries inspired some young Kurds to volunteer to join in a fight to the finish against the reactionaries. The revolutionaries continued on to Qazvin. They sent scouts out to inspect Qazvin's situation and defenses and weapons. On March 19, set off for Pachenar. Set up a strategic center there, which they considered impossible to abandon (?). Three roads to Tabriz passed through it. From here, the revolutionaries could besiege their adversary. The revolutionaries' security of the area. Sent ten fighters to a village to protect it from Tehran. In the mountains, stationed ten. The rest stayed in Pachinar. The fighting force grew. Not a day passed before ten or fifteen armed fighters didn't arrive. The Russian consul was now going from Rasht to Tehran and observed the revolutionaries' fortifications with the revolutionaries stationed along it. Had some hundreds of armed fighters, according to the Russian consul Shtriter. He saw up to 500 in Pachinar, left wing, 100 well-armed Iranian and Caucasian . On the right wing, 100 . 180 fighters in the center, led by Yeprim, in the Kharzani mountains (?) which dominated the surrounding countryside. He had 200 feda'is. Barricaded and entrenched. The Shah had 1270 men stationed in Qazvin, very demoralized, not prepared for battle. Against the revolutionaries well-armed and trained, the Shahs men are feeble. Something about Customs losing 7969 tumans, occupied by the revolutionaries. Shtriter wants to introduce Russian troops. Would improve Iranian morale. They would cut off the nationalists' supply lines and restore contact with the Shah's feudal reactionaries. The number of revolutionaries increased. The number of Caucasians reached 400. By mid-April, in Pachinar, there were 50 Georgians alone. After Panov left Rasht, the Anjoman and the Military Committee cooperated relatively better. But every now and then, troubles with the fellow-travelers. 93 People who use the revolution as an opportunity to plunder and loot. Georgians first raised voices against this disorder. Compares to the Mongols. They entered Talesh led by Sayyed Ashraf (?). Up till 1907, i.e., Sattar Khan's uprising, he commanded for the famous reactionary feudal Amin os-Saltane. Despite serving Amin os-Saltane, he roused his bands, left his home, , and distributed his wealth to his peasants. Caused much damage to Amin os-Salatane's army, too: left two cannon in swamps, forced Amin os-Saltane to . Took refuge with the Russian (!) consulate. Izwolski tells Graf Bakesdorf (?) in London that he is troubled by the situation due to the presence of the Caucasians and a variety of others. Might even reach Tehran. Worse and worse. Mid-April: the revolutionaries had 500 men along the Rasht-Qazvin road. The Russians were busy with Tabriz, entered the heroic city April 18.This affected everyone. 94 Lots of meetings held in cities across Iran, especially Rasht. Caused a panic among the revolutionaries. The Russian press Ardebil to send troops against Rasht. Military muster in Tehran and Qazvin, too. The revolutionaries are thinking about going for Ardebil first, to relieve Tabriz and force `Ain od-Dawle out. But now that Tsarist troops were there.... Qazvin was not a more realistic option. More accessible and would cut the Shah's reach the north, including his access to `Ain od-Dawle. Conversely, it forms a good bridgehead to Tehran. 95 Qazvin's reaction led by Ghiyas-e Nezam. Blood-enemy of the revolutionaries, having lost two sons, one in Rasht, the other in Tabriz, to them. A major feudal himself, owning many villages. Owned two Kurdish villages. Militarized his Kurds. Up to 1000 troops. 200 shock troops. One, under his sons, in charge of the Tehran road. Sent some to Pachinar to fight the revolutionaries and suddenly strike a blow. The Shah's troops were supposed to simultaneously leave Qazvin. But he didn't understand the revolutionaries' tactics and the revolutionaries were ready. 100 Gilanis led by Hamid os-Soltan seized the mountains and cut off the road. On his request, Mo`ezz rushed three Georgian bombers. 200 Gilanis with Montazer od-Dawle, a protégé of Sepahdar. Described by the diarist as a true Iranian feudal. Big-bellied rascal and a coward. So they didn't want to .

60 96 Georgian and Armenian men under Yeprim in Kharzan. They were mostly bombers. They cut off the road. April 1, well-armed mountain forces were sent from Ghiyas's son's base to ambush the revolutionaries. But a scout . Besieged by the Georgian forces. Orderly (?) retreat. 'The khans didn't have a chance to raise their voices before all turned to retreat.... After Panov left Rasht, the Georgians there took a different tactic. Decided to form united troops with the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians. Because some of the local forces were unreliable. When Hamid os-Soltan's forces, which had been stationed in the Ambu (?) Mountains .

Holiday.

97 April 7, a force of 12 Georgians and 7 Iranians entered Loshan (?). The peasants welcomed (?) the revolutionaries in every village. Almost all the women in the mountain villages were barefaced (?) and beckoned their guests to enter and take off their shoes. Repeated with joy yashasin Gorji. After three days (April 23), they reached Ambu. 300 fighters stationed there. Met them in rows of two, with some riding out with red flags to greet them. The Caucasians were quite; the first word was from the Iranian commander, `Aliev (!), 'Salam, ayan-e Gorji.... The Georgians answered, 'Yashasin mashrute.... The Caucasians fired into the air. The revolutionaries and the reactionaries were both in the mountains, 1 verst apart. Quotes Japaridze. Reports that Ghiyas's third son is advancing from Qazvin and mustering near their right flank. Standing against him are and the Megrelians. 30 Muslims under Hamid os-Soltan. 98 The enemy already occupies Ambu. A river between. An old bridge over the river. Japaradze has additional details about the Georgian revolutionary entrance to Ambu. Clear that the diarist had seen these eents first hand. Ghiyas sent a peasant to sy on the revolutionaries, but they arrested him, but didn't harm hm because they realized he had been forced. Sent him back with false information: only 20 Georgians. The remaining 300 are Kurds who are ready to answer to you. April 13: The revolutionaries are prepared to attack. Crossing the bridge was dangerous. 99 So they crossed by boat. (Japaridze says it was Gurji Sergo's idea.) On the raft, 80 fighters on the other side. The raft landed (?). 13 Georgians. The rest, Gilanis and Kurds. A follow-up group (?) of 15 led by the Georgian Patara Datiko (David Simon dze Kiladze (b. 1885)). Had to stop at the water and set up a fire ambuscade by pouring oil on the river. Then his group, too, passed over the river and ignited it. The local leader had 65 people search for a place to ford the river. It had swelled and was fst. Unexpected downpour. So they decided to retreat. Reached their tents exausted, wet, 10 a.m. Now complicated by the treat from Sa`id-e Nezam. In spite of this, sent 40 men with Little Datikos led by Arsena. (Had lived six years inIran and was converted and called `Ali Khan. Arrested in Rasht and was turned over to the government. Had an honorable position in the militia.) They quickly reached Sa`id-e Nezam's village. Sa`id-e Nezam's bands wereamred and that . the revolutionaries stationed in Kharzan sent to the fighting squad 2 Georgian fighters who descended on the enemy forces from the end of Ambu. A clash with the reactionary bands in Nak village (?). the revolutionaries in Kharzan decided tolaunch their own attack on Amb. But Hamid os-Soltan didn't want it. Wanted to stay in Ambu where he could rob and plunder. The Georgians opposed him. Hmid os-Soltan suggested they got to another village. The Georgians considered this arrogant and Little Misha (Japaradze?) 100 went to him. Other Caucasian fighters went to fight the enemy on their own. A fight, brief. The enemy was defeated and retreated. Took refuge in the mountain villages, pursued by the revolutionaries. Occupied Ghiyas's sole village and barricaded it and stationed about its gates. The guard arrested tenmen and women,among them Ghiyas's son and wife. Shocked Ghiyas. The revolutionaries told him to surrender if he wanted to see his son. 101 Chakishvili stresses the harmony of the different versions of these stories. With the march on Qazvin, enters the final stage. Thedefeat cut off the governments from access to the revolutionaries and brought Qazvin closer. There were battles not described in detail by the diarist and for which we have no sources. All we have is a little in Kasravi's book. Nor Ivanov. Kasravi uses and Iranian source for the capture of Qazvin. The rout of Ghiyas's men (18 Years, p. 24). 102 The march on Qazvin. Shah's troops retreat before the engagement (?). The revolutionaries are face to face with Qazvin. They do an end run around the Shah's troops , who have rallied. Also, had to maneuver because Masih Khan's band of 7000 Qarajedaghis had arrived. The latter had launched a provocation to split away his bands and help the Shah's forces. But the revolutionaries found out about the plot. Went on to Qazvin and threatened it after neutralizing the plot. Decided on a surprise attack on the sourthern gate. Gilani and Caucasian fighters. They had close ties with secret revolutionary groups in Tabriz. Used these to get information on the enemy. Quotes Kasravi (18 Years, p. 24) on the Tabriz secret groups, their names, etc. 103 Also the Istambul people (Sa`adat) 104 Quotes Kasravi quoting the Blue Book. No other Persian sources on the Caucasians in the seizure of Qazvin so far. 105 Proceeds to the diarist. Dark enough on May 4 for the revolutionaries to race horses by Qazvin from the direction of Rasht and swing around to the Tehran gate. They charged the gate, shooting their guns and throwing bombs and yelling Yashasin mashrute and suddenly entered the city. On their first charge, the revolutionaries reached the governor's mansion. The enemy put up furious resistance. They prepared a barricade against the revolutionaries under cover of fire from the palace. Locked the gates and resisted. Locked the gates and resisted. Impossible to ignite the pillars with oil lamps. Took whatever they found--abandoned tents, carpets, etc., and ignited them. In 5 hours, the gate gradually ingnited. The walls and pillars gradually caught fire. Yeprim, Japaridze, Abram, and some of the best fighters charged the palace from the Rasht gate and reached the `Ali Qapu gate and the cravanserai and engaged Masih Khan. The 90 cavalry spread out. Many cowards had fled. Sasha (?) was wounded. More wounds. 106 The enemy tried to charge out, but were cut down, one after the next crumbled to the ground. Gigos' exploits. 'I die for my comrades' well-being. Farewell, goody-bye.... His comrades tried to reassure him. Abram the Greek is now wounded. Enter the `Ali Qapu with some Iranian feda'is and Armenians. Masih Khan fled to the caravansera's thick walls and ordered the sentries. The din of the bombs, guns, and people. Misha (fn. 260 biography of Patari Misha. His wounding related by Japaridze: When we entered the caravanserai, were met with fire from the cavalry. Returned fire. The enemy retreated to a barricade. Just as he was about to throw the bomb, he was hit in the hand by a bullet and the bomb fell. Hit by another bullet, blood streamed and he fell. Locals picked him up in a stretcher.) threw bombs in front of the palace to blanket it with fire, but fell wounded. 107 By morning, after eight hours' battle, Masih Khan is defeated, captured. His forces were disarmed and released (?). Meanwhile, at the palace: A great destruction, walls and so on shot through with bullets and shrapnel. A terrible battle broke out. Now noon. Several times, the Shah's forces were given the chance to lay down their arms, to no avail. Bombs thrown. Many casualties by the losing side forced to surrender 2 p.m. some came to the gate. Told them to lay down their arms. They all begged to be pardoned and their lives spared. 400 surrendered. The Qazvinis met with the aged governor in the palace. Seized four cannon, 700 various guns and bullets. Also described in Ruskoe Slovo by Krinsky, who was based in Tehran. Based on foreigners' statements. The diarist talks of the participation of the 'leading khans.... At the time, the Caucasians were fighting in Qazvin, Montazer od-Dawle's 200 troops were in Pachinar puffing on their water pipes. 108 If the revolutionaries were defeated, no loss, When he saw the revolutionaries were winning, they led their toops into Qazvin yelling, 'Yashasin Montazer od-Dawle.... As soon as they came in, they began to oppress the people. His son, too, who had lived in Petersburg and studied and knew Russian and abandoned to 'the famous (infamous?) Christian leader... Yeprim Khan. He pocketed 1200 tumans of Tatar-Russian money and distributed it to Mo`ezz's brother, Motib os-Soltan Mirza `Ali Khan, Salar-e Faji` (?) and others. Other unworthy deeds against the true revolutionaries. This is confirmed by M. Krinski. He wrote that the first attack on Qazvin was half Caucasian--Armenian and Georgian. A conflict that day between the Caucasians and the Iranians which almost came to blows. After the executions of a reactionary sheikh, the Iranians wanted to plunder his vast wealth. Only on Yeprim's intervention did this end without bloodshed. The burial of revolutionaries, including Yoseb Tskimanauri (?). On April 25, an Iranian Cossack officer was captured and shot on Yeprim's orders. Also an Armenian. 109 4 revolutionaries died and 18 wounded. Masih Khan's Qarajedaghi forces lost 120 dead and 200 wounded. After the seizure of Qazvin, set up an anjoman, 'composed mostly of the khans' relatives.... Newspaper Enqelab published. Some anti-feudal and progressive measures were passed in Qazvin on the democrat's Mirza `Ali Mohammad's initiatives. Anjoman decreed a ban on forms of torture in prison (?). Kasravi: Mohammad Vali Khan Sepahdar had still not left Rasht. Came only after Qazvin was liberated. The leading khans held a pompous meeting for him. 110 Russian consul in the way. Holds the Caucasians present are Russian citizens. The seizure of Qazvin implied an immeasurable fear among the Tehran aristocrats. Kasravi: Hold a solemn military procession for the foreign diplomats and big shots (ministers, governors, etc.) Mixed with sorrow. The reactionaries, who had destroyed the anjoman [Majlis?], were feverish that the revolutionaries would soon reach them. 111 The disagreement among the revolutionaries and the Shah became know in Tehran's Russian mission. Quotes from the Sbornik on Shepahdar's fear of the Caucasians. He cannon control them. The forces which took Qazvin were mostly the Caucasians, whom Sepahdar cannot,etc. The colonialists urged the Shah to publish a decree. The Shah needed to divide the revolutionaries. Tries to get Sepahsalar to return to mojaheds to Rasht. (See Kasravi, 18 Years, p. 26.) The diarist: `Ain od-Dawle returned from Tabriz and was now in Tehran. Instead of with the Russian forces. Frightened by the capture of Qazvin and so moved towards the constitutionalists. Sepahdar made a big deal of this and staged a reconciliation with him. The Iranians, especially the Gilanis' leading khans, were disoriented by this. Should they and continue the struggle? 112 The diarist was clear. Saw the Shah's promise of restoring the Constitution as a hoax to derail the armed march on the capital. On the other hand, the leading khans' counter-revolutionary role. Informal discussions between Sepahsalar in Qazvin and Samsam os-Saltane on forming a joint force to march on Tehran. Everyone rushed towards this undertaking, according to the diarist. 113 On the unsurpassed fighting qualities of the Bakhtiaris: They were not all-powerful. The episode of Shah `Abbas capturing Georgia and sending them to resist the Lurish and Kurdish tribes. They heroically did this, and preserved their language and customs. The Fereidun Georgians. Bakhtiars' perpetual internecine strife. Frequently helped outside powers. The British. Some Bakhtiaris helped `Ain od-Dawle against 114-115 Tabriz. Cites Kasravi. Sbornik on the crisis in Isfahan. Russians and British on the change in the balance events in Isfahan. Samsam's interests in all this, the Russians (?) say it's a cynical ploy to win tribal leadership. No effect. The usual khan-khani. 118 Expresses skepticism about Sepahdar's appointments as governor. They make the 'revolutionary... khans happy. To get the Caucasians and the local feda'is to disband Wanted nothing to do with the Caucasian fighters now in Iran and excluded them from his future plans. Send them home. RS reports that 100 armed Georgian and Armenian in Qazvin. Sepahdar's appointments as governor and the expulsion of the Caucasians delighted the reactionaries and colonialists. Quotes the Russian consul in Qazvin as calling it an 'advantageous coup.... 119 Reaction's happiness was short lived. Bakhtiar advances forced Sepahdar to face Tehran. Mid-June, a lot of Georgians and Caucasian and Gilani returned to Rasht to 120 join up with them. Long quote from Kasravi. 121 British so-called support to the constitutionalists. They really wanted a weak and submissive monarchy rather than an parliamentary regime. Criticizes Fraser for saying the constitution came from the British embassy. The real source and spread of these progressive ideas were the Russian and Caucasian revolutionaries. 122 The Shah is in fear. More Kasravi. 123 Diarist: The revolutionaries dug in their best barricades and waited for the Shah's Bakhtiaris and Cossacks. Sardar Mofakhkham had had a falling out with the other Bakhtiari chiefs and took the Shah's side. Quotes Amirkhizi. The battle with Cossacks was furious. Panic swept the Qazvinis. Details of the battle from Amirkhizi. The Gilani leading khan Montazer od-Dawle was the first to lead his men back. Suggested to Sepahdar that he also retreat. The latter hesitated, not wanting to break with Sardar As`ad, and so decided to advance. 124 Gilan's leading khans saw they were unable without the Georgian bomb-throwers to make serious progress. So telegrammed Rasht and recalled them. After negotiations, they agreed. They set out as before, to the cry of 'Yashasin Gorji.... Georgians and Qarabaghis, who had recently formed close ties, established themselves in Qazvin. Diarist: 3 Georgians are really so badly needed by 200 (2000?) troops or it is difficult for them to go against the enemy? Yes. The Georgian firmness in battle famous all over Iran. 1) In battle, they go to the fore, 2) the bomb, only the Georgians know about it, except the Russians, but they are on the Georgians' side (?). 125 The Georgians and the Qarabaghis advanced without pause. On the way, they met the 'leading khans.... Held a pompous meeting in the old Shahabad castle. Armed with Mausers and modern three-shots. The revolutionaries gathered up to 200 guns here and there from the peasants, which had been distributed by the Shah's forces to resist the revolutionaries. News of the Bakhtiaris. More on the British and Russian negotiations. 126 Underlines that the Bakhtiaris were resisting the British and the Russians demand that they turn back. 127 Kasravi again. On linking of the forces. More details on the two armies. The diarist: Tehran learned of the revolutionaries' bold advance and came up with a scheme: The Russians and the British sent men in the Shah's name to stop the advance and promise that the Shah will respond to all their demands. Sepahdar agreed, but he ultimately did not stop. The determination of the revolutionaries and the Bakhtiari advances ultimately made the British/Russian mediation pointless. The Russian army entered Qazvin from Tabriz. Tehran is strongly held by the Shah's forces. All held by the Shah's troops. Sepahdar saw that the Shah's ambassadors were lying (?). Threatened that the Shah's troops would advance from Tehran if they dared advance. Sepahdar could no longer and everyone advanced. By evening, they reached a certain village in Qazvin province. The Bakhtiaris and the Qazvinis link up. Quotes Kasravi. 129 Criticizes him for misunderstanding due to a lack of sources. Instead, the diarist is exact on the unity. Sepahdar sent 40 Bakhtiaris to parlay. The Gilanis didn't recognize them. Resisted them and killed some. The Bakhtiaris didn't return fire. They then realized.... The Bakthiaris identified themselves as Samsam's men. Nobody understood. The Gilanis advanced. 500 Gilanis were forced back. They came to a barricade meant for the Shah's troops and there was a massacre. (?) The Gilanis, Yeprim Khan left a lorry full of explosives along with Georgian bomb-thrower Petre Pochkhu, who was sick. Got out and fought. After some to and fro, no one was taken (alive?) So heroically died he far from the homeland, in Iran 130 While this [treacherous massacre against the Gilanis] was going on, the Georgians and the Qarabaghis from Rasht were settling in in a village awaiting Mo`ezz's horses. Men armed with bombs entered the field of battle. The evil news reached them. They went through swamps which dragged on them hand and foot and went to their aid. They soon met the Gilani 'leading khans..., who were the first to leave the battlefield. The Gilanis and the Qarabaghis quickly took up positions. They slowly armed the bombs (?) which were in the lorry and threw them at where the enemy was congregated. Sent scouts ahead. Found the enemy center and they brought it under heavy bomb and six-shot fire. The enemy retreated to the edge of the village. Later, they saw a fortification on a hill with cannon and red flag. Asked who they were and threatened to attack it. Said they were Bakhtiaris on their side. They joined forces and so the two streams joined together. It was discovered that the Shah's forces had surprised these Bakhtiaris, who were to unite with the Gilanis. They 131 unified and advanced, but only went forward 200 steps when they met the enemy's vanguard. During this battle, according to the diarist, the Georgians saw the Bakhtiaris' bravery. Neither bullet nor cannon could stop them. The Georgians used their Mausers, which the Bakhtiaris didn't have, on the enemy camp. Hand to hand combat (?). Two hours. Enemy retreated to his stronghold. Abandoned 27 casualties, 50 guns, and 7 Bakhtiar-Cossack dead. 32 (?) casualties among the revolutionaries. Cites Kasravi (18 Years, p. 54). 132 A six-day battle. More Kasravi, British and Russian diplomatic reports and contemporary press. Also David Fraser. 133 More Kasravi 134 on this battle. The diarist says, On the left front and the village of Damaviz (?), fought Yeprim and what was left of the Gilanis, who had had a bad day and had nearly been defeated. Some of the best standard-bearers (i.e., Dashnaks) together with Yeprim had been deceived by royalist Bakhtiaris and were captured (?) Abandoned their arms and taken prisoner. (Was Yeprim captured?!) But then along came their comrades. 15 Bakhtiaris were killed and the prisoners were released, although disarmed. After they were released, the Gilanis left flank regrouped and attacked the enemy. The enemy retreated to Badamak and there was cannon fire from both sides. The enemy left up to 20 casualties on the field. The revolutionaries had 2 dead, 6 wounded. Khacho also died. Shah's chief forces installed in Lalei Suleyman. The revolutionary Bakhtiaris were unable to take it: Each contingency had been planned for (?). The Georgians were not able to reach it with their bombs. A frontal assault would have mean lots of casualties and so Sepahdar ruled it out. Enter neighboring village, Badamak, with the Bakhtiaris and the Qarabaghis. The enemy opened cannon fire. The revolutionaries responded. 3 hour artillery dual. The revolutionaries encamped in the field and in open lines attacked the enemy. The Cossacks retreated and with difficulty managed to get the cannons from the field. 135 The revolutionaries lost 2 men and up to 10 horses. The Russian captains of the Persian Cossack Brigade. The Cossack Brigade in general. Weaknesses of the Shah's army. Not the defender of the people's interest, etc. From RS. 136 Sends them into battle via Karaj and via Qom. 137 A discussion of British and Russian policy. Mainly 138 from RS. Disappointed with the British, who didn't protest. Sepahdar stands up to the two powers. Russians strengthen the occupation of the north with British 139 acquiescence. 140 More on Russian military mobilizations. They eye Qazvin. The British in Bushire and Bandar `Abbas. 141 More from RS. On the other imperialist powers: Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire are still opposed to the freedom movement, despite their enmity with Russia and the UK. France is a partner with Russia and the UK and applauds the Russians Like their installation of `Abd ul-`Aziz in Morocco. The French press calls Iran 'Russia's Morocco.... 142 Tehran Sattar Committee appealed to the Iranian Cossack officers not to fight their own people. The Reactionaries are in a panic. Nejat founded. Editor: Haji Mohammad Khorasani. 147 From RS. The monarchism of the Rasht revolutionaries, the Anjoman chief Dr. Esma`il Khan. 148 The doctor's life in the UK. The Georgians were the best fighters, despite their insignificant numbers. Their courage and morale and their faith in victory implanted in the Bakhtiaris and the mojaheds and the feda'is. Quotes from Gurji Sergo to this effect. The arrival of the Georgian bomb-throwers encouraged the Bakhtiar gunners (?) to fire accurately at the fortress of royalist forces a Lalei Soleiman fortress, commanded by Russian officers. The mojaheds did not want the Shah's overthrow. The Bakhtiaris wanted to see first hand the Georgians' famous bombs. So them made a demonstration. Describes it. 'If you'd only do that to Tehran's walls, we'd be able to get into the city.... 149 As it would happen, Tehran would be taken without the walls being blown up. Kasravi on the military situation in Tehran. Well-defended. Desperate defense. Notes disparity between Kasravi and Sablin's dispatch (#388)--Sardar Mafakhem gave way and the revolutionaries bypassed him at night. Also: some reactionaries deserted to the revolutionaries with their guns. Needed to best horses to get to Tehran. Mo`ezz kept his hidden (?). 150 The Bakhtiaris gave up some of theirs. But the Georgians had to go along with the Gilanis. Mo`ezz and Montazer od-Dowle and Mirza `Ali Mohammad Khan did not go along. Only Sardar As`ad and 200 Bakhtiaris went forward and 200 troops of Sepahdar and 100 of Yeprim's feda'is. The latter's forces included Caucasians and Iranian Muslims, Armenians, and 2 Georgians, according to Kasravi. Some Georgians and Qarabaghis stayed behind for want of horses. Gurji Sergo: all together, 5000. by simply firing into the air and shouting they were able to drive the enemy out. 151 Shows that Amir Mofakhkham did not stay and fight the revolutionaries. Discussion of which gate they entered from. Fraser, Russians, Ivanov, Kasravi, Amirkhizi. 152 The diarist confirms one of them. The revolutionaries rushed in so fast they could not tell Liakhov in time. 153 Only light fighting (Kasravi). 154 Gilanis' role in using bombs to scatter defenders of the Baharestan. Armenians feared a pogrom and hid with the British. Participated: Georgians, a baptized Jew, Mikhael Bogdanov. Another dig at Mo`ezz os-Soltan: He did not arrived for the seizure of the Baharestan and the Majlis. Cossacks who resisted. Led by Cpt. Zapolski, at the Qazvin Gate. 155 All the while, the local constitutionalists (the author identifies them with the big shot Majlis members) like Sani` od-Dawle were in the British embassy. 156 The Georgians and the Qarabaghis and the Bakhtiaris take Tehran. Streets soaked with blood (!). 157 Kasravi quoted on the taking of Tehran. More on the fighting from the Sbornik. 158 More of same. The Shah's troops rob everything they can. Liakhov bombards the revolutionaries' positions. Because of the foreign interests, the revolutionaries observe a cease-fire against the Cossacks. The Diarist gives a British telegram to this effect, refereeing 159 specifically to the Georgian bomb-throwers. The consuls are concerned with the refugees. Quotes Kasravi again. A heated battle the next day. Georgians and Caucasians few in number but determined. Won respect. They are obliged to defend foreigners in `Ala od-Dawle street against provocations by the Shah's troops. Georgians armed with bombs and six-shooters. Hold their posts. RS correspondent pitched in and helped. 160 Objects to the tendentiousness of the Russian diplomatic releases. (In reference to an expression of the lack of initiative of both sides.) Neither gives the other quarter (?). But seems to object mostly to the Shah's troops (the Silakhuris in particular). Kasravi says that lots of people were killed in the city those three days, about 300. 161 Again, dumps on Mo`ezz: Only when it became clear that the revolutionaries had won does Sardar Mohiy make an appearance. He sent representatives that night into the city. He sent a cannon and some bullets to help the revolutionaries (quotes Kasravi). Reminds the reader of how he had retreated during the taking of Qazvin. The Shah stockpiles his treasure. 162 Agreement to keep the Cossack brigade intact, replacing the Russian with local officers. Liakhov chooses who they will be. Liakhov asks the 'revolutionary khans... about keeping the Cossacks armed. Sepahdar and Sardar As`ad praise their courage and say yes. Leaves the imperialist weapon intact. 163 Liakhov given a respectable escort out. A landlord-bourgeois coalition government. Big landlords, Bakhtiari tribal chiefs, Qajar feudal aristocracy, and big bourgeoisie. From Qajar absolutism to Qajar constitutional 164 monarchy. No improvement for the productive classes. On the contrary, it derailed the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist movement. Imperialist concessions. In conclusion, the author writes, 'So ended the Iranian revolution (if it can be called a revolution). It chose its own fate. The ministers need servants and so they prepared to open the people's parliament.... The author's conclusion: Iran's unfinished revolution. Only a stage was completed. 1911, reaction showed it was not overcome. The 1917 Russian Revolution blah blah blah.